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South Bend, Indiana: A Case Study
Of The Possibilities And Realities Of
Hospital Cooperation
by Joseph P. Bauer
South Bend, the county seat of St. Joseph
County, Indiana, is a city with a population of
slightly more than 100,000.' Located about 100
miles from Chicago, it serves many of the edu-
cational, financial and health care needs of a five
county metropolitan area of over 700,000
people.2 South Bend and its "sister city,"
Mishawaka,' are served by four general hospi-
tals. The two largest each have about 40 percent
of the available beds in the community. One of
them, Memorial Hospital of South Bend, is a not-
for-profit corporation which is unaffiliated with
any other hospital; the other large hospital, St.
Joseph's Medical Center, is a Catholic hospital
which is part of the Holy Cross Health System
Corp.4 The other two hospitals, Michiana Com-
munity Hospital5 and St. Joseph Hospital of
Mishawaka,6 each have roughly 10 percent of
the available beds in the community.
7
In 1992, the intense level of discussion
of health care issues in the presidential elections,
coupled with enhanced pressure from several
large local employers for greater
steps to achieve containment of Joseph P. Ba
costs in the delivery of health School. Pro
care, led to the creation of a sity of Penns.
Health Care Task Force in St. School in 19
Joseph County. Then, in 1993, Newbold, Ste
acting in part in response to the preparat
grants from the National Civic Kathleen Ka
League and a local foundation, Law School
the South Bend-Mishawaka Area Chamber of
Commerce coordinated the transformation of this
Task Force into a multi-level project, designed
to attempt to identify, and then meet, a variety
of community needs on a systematic and coop-
erative basis among many of the educational,
religious and social service organizations in the
community. Named the Healthy Communities
Initiative, it was intended to facilitate mecha-
nisms for the promotion of the physical and
mental well-being of all the citizens of the
County. About 95 persons drawn from various
sectors of the community, called stakeholders,
agreed to be founding members of this organi-
zation, and to draw on their experiences, con-
tacts and other resources to implement its goals.
Because its constituency was broadly based,
among its implicit goals was to give an endorse-
ment to the assessment of the needs of the com-
munity, including existing gaps, and to solutions
for addressing those needs. The Healthy Com-
munities Initiative is not targeted merely at the
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delivery of traditional health care; instead, it is
intended to address the many areas which im-
pact on "health." Therefore, it includes within
the ambit of its interests such diverse, but im-
portant, components as education, housing, jobs,
crime, drugs, education and so forth.
My involvement with the antitrust as-
pects of this Initiative began at the behest of my
wife, one of its stakeholders and the associate
director of Madison Center and Hospital, the
area's principal community mental health pro-
vider.8 Correctly recognizing that the intersec-
tion of health care and antitrust would continue
to be a "cutting edge" area in the coming years,
she urged me to meet with various participants
in the Initiative involved in the health care area.
My invitation to this Conference, which is ex-
amining this important area, became the final
prod to consider one aspect of this topic, the
antitrust implications of joint, or cooperative,
ventures by health care providers.
Let me begin by describing my antitrust
philosophy, and thus my initial views of this area.
I am unabashedly "liberal," or, to translate into
the antitrust lingo, enforcement-minded. Instinc-
tively, I look askance at the justifications often
offered by competitors for their joint undertak-
ings, and am instead inclined to prefer rules
which induce individual efforts by competitors.
Furthermore, much of the antitrust litigation
against entities in the health care industry, be they
hospitals, providers or organizations, has in-
volved instances of cooperative activity consti-
tuting price fixing or other forms of horizontal
restraints, thereby crossing the lines of legality.9
Thus, my initial suspicion was that the hospitals
(and perhaps other health care providers) in St.
Joseph County might attempt to use the umbrella
of the Healthy Communities Initiative as an op-
portunity to undertake activities which might well
be prohibited by the Sherman Act"° .
In fact, my conversations and involve-
ment with this project indicate that quite the op-
posite is true. While a few cooperative projects
have been initiated, some even before the Healthy
Communities Initiative was formed, and some
other useful ideas are now being discussed, these
have, at least to date, fallen far short of the kinds
of ventures which would raise antitrust concerns.
It is clear that the antitrust laws have not been
violated. If anything, a combination of fear and
possible misapprehension of the limits of the law,
as well as some other factors to be described
below, have inhibited forms of cooperation which
could enhance both the health and financial well-
being of the citizens of St. Joseph County and
the surrounding area.
To date, some of the joint ventures which
have been undertaken, sometimes by the two
largest hospitals and sometimes by all four, have
actually involved comparatively significant ar-
eas. For example, the principal magnetic reso-
nance imaging center in the community is co-
owned by Memorial Hospital, St. Joseph's Medi-
cal Center, and two groups of radiologists. The
hospitals have also implemented joint guidelines
for credentialing certain physician specialties;
have jointly recruited a physician in a special-
ized field; have shared certain rarely used equip-
ment; and have arranged for combined ambu-
lance services or cardiac transport services.
Whether by agreement or merely in recognition
of the needs of the community, a number of medi-
cal services are offered at fewer than all of the
hospitals in the community. I The hospitals have
also begun the formation of a Health Care Ser-
vices Council, in an attempt to determine what
gaps exist in the provision of medical care. While
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still in the study stage, this Council has been at-
tempting to draft common clinical standards, to
develop a common intake form, to share certain
patient information, and to develop uniform ethi-
cal guidelines.
Other cooperative ventures have been
more modest. These have included producing
joint brochures; undertaking coordinated semi-
nars, education programs or health fairs, both for
health care professionals and for various sectors
of the community; and providing backup care
for certain medical specialties.
Several other cooperative projects will
either be undertaken shortly or are in the discus-
sion or planning stages. These include programs
to promote infant immunization and to expand
mammography screening; a forum on teen preg-
nancy; and, perhaps most important, the devel-
opment of a joint community needs assessment.
Yet, problems in implementing these last two
projects also illustrate the difficulties inherent in
cooperation.
Several months ago, under the auspices
of the Healthy Communities Initiative, the four
hospitals in South Bend began planning a joint
program for the fall of 1996 to address the vari-
ous problems associated with teen pregnancy,
including a public forum to be held in the local
convention center. Only recently, however, the
two Catholic hospitals announced that they could
not sponsor any program at which family plan-
ning and contraception were to be discussed. It
now appears that the program will be held, un-
der the sponsorship only of Memorial Hospital
and the United Way, with participation by the
other hospitals limited to appearances by some
of their representatives.
Since fulfillment of the governmentally-
imposed requirement that every hospital must
perform an assessment of community needs re-
quires gathering and then analysis of much of
the same data, such a project seemingly would
present another opportunity for cooperation. But,
in fact, since the assessment process would also
require each hospital to share information both
of perceived gaps in local coverage and poten-
tial areas of overlap or redundancy, there has been
some reluctance by the larger two hospitals to
make this a common undertaking.
In the fall of 1994, the U.S. Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission is-
sued a series of nine joint Policy Statements re-
garding the applicability of the antitrust laws to
the health care industry.2 The rationale for the
promulgation of these Policy Statements is that
certain characteristics of the health care indus-
try 3 justify according it special (and this is trans-
lated as more favorable) treatment under the an-
titrust laws.
An examination of these Statements sug-
gests that a rather broad range of possibilities
exists for quite lawful joint ventures by compet-
ing health care providers. It would appear, how-
ever, that many of these have, at least to date,
not been discussed, much less implemented, by
the four hospitals in St. Joseph County. Among
the kinds of conduct identified in these State-
ments which hospitals might undertake are joint
ventures involving high technology or other ex-
pensive equipment; joint ventures involving spe-
cialized clinical or other expensive health care
services; the collective provision of certain in-
formation, both fee- and non-fee-related, to con-
sumers of health care services; participation in
exchanges of price and cost information; and
joint purchasing arrangements. Other coopera-
tive undertakings not directly covered by these
Statements could include sharing personnel in
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specialty areas; joint negotiations with third party
payors; and development of planning or needs
assessment projects.
On the other hand, although inter-hospi-
tal cooperation is more limited than the Policy
Statements seemingly would permit, there is evi-
dence that the hospitals in South Bend are en-
gaged in a wide variety of cooperative relations
both with other sectors of the health care indus-
try and with other organizations in the commu-
nity. These include participation in networks
with physicians and other health care providers;
affiliation with preferred provider organizations
(PPOs); long-term contracts with, or even acqui-
sitions of, groups of physicians; programs with
schools, social service organizations and other
community groups; 14 various contractual rela-
tionships with insurers; and agreements both with
smaller general hospitals in adjacent counties and
with mental health facilities. This trend, towards
treating the delivery of health care as a package
or system, with hospitals being responsible prin-
cipally for providing one of its components, acute
care and other procedures requiring costly facili-
ties, is likely to be the "wave of the future" for
cooperative efforts.
Nonetheless, a clear theme of the Policy
Statements is that many cooperative arrange-
ments between otherwise competing hospitals
can be pro-competitive (or at worst benign), and
can enhance efficiency, reduce costs, and increase
the quality and diversity of health care services
at prices which on average will be lower. Be-
cause uncertainty or fear may discourage hospi-
tals from engaging in desirable cooperative ven-
tures, the Statements set forth a number of "anti-
trust safety zones," identifying circumstances
under which the two agencies will not challenge
conduct under the antitrust laws. The statements
also seek to make clear that other conduct, fall-
ing outside these safety zones, is not necessarily
unlawful. Recognizing that antitrust analysis is
inherently fact-intensive, the Statements set forth
various factors to be used by the agencies to
evaluate the lawfulness of that other conduct. Fi-
nally, the Justice Department and FTC offer busi-
ness review and advisory opinion procedures,
permitting parties to proposed transactions to
obtain an evaluation of their specific proposals,
to learn of the agencies' enforcement intentions.
The combination of these substantive standards
and procedural vehicles are intended to encour-
age broader implementation of a variety of con-
certed activities by otherwise competing hospi-
tals. 5
In light of the permissive antitrust climate
in the "real world,"16 one might ask why more
extensive cooperation has not occurred among
the hospitals in St. Joseph County (and appar-
ently in most other communities, for that mat-
ter). First, the lack of a history of significant
joint ventures, and inexperience with intensive
cooperation, may simply take time to overcome.
Thus, one can hope that a combination of devel-
oping a tradition of cooperation, and the confi-
dence-building which should result from those
first steps, will lead to yet more extensive coop-
erative efforts.
Some representatives of the hospital sec-
tor of the industry urge that the antitrust laws,
even as unenforced as they are in the present cli-
mate, are still unduly restrictive of cooperation,1
7
and that competition, which is the core value
underlying antitrust, is itself part of the problem. 8
Not surprisingly, I disagree. 19 In fact, there prob-
ably are few, if any, joint ventures which would
truly benefit consumers, which are actually be-
ing inhibited by any limitations imposed by the
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antitrust laws.20 To the contrary, today, the pos-
sibility of challenges under the antitrust laws al-
most always only serves to limit genuinely anti-
competitive conduct.2' In any event, as I describe
below, because of other factors, it is not at all
clear that even if the antitrust laws were com-
pletely repealed today, significantly enhanced
levels of desirable cooperation would break out
tomorrow. 22 Thus, I firmly reject these calls for
even greater permissiveness for the health care
industry23 as the prescription for its ills.
24
However, there are a number of other
reasons for the tentative steps to date towards
cooperation. These take a variety of political,
legal, economic and strategic forms. First of all,
as suggested above, I believe that a misunder-
standing of the already liberal boundaries of the
antitrust laws is a significant explanation for the
absence of greater cooperation.25 Thus, for ex-
ample, in this exploding age of computerization,
information storage and retrieval systems are
becoming increasing costly, complicated and
critical. Although it is far from clear that devel-
opment of a common system would raise anti-
trust problems, the very possibility of illegality
may result in a reluctance to discuss such a joint
venture.
Hospitals are living today in an environ-
ment of intense competition, for patients, for af-
filiations with individual providers, for consum-
mation of long-term relationships with insurance
companies and with employers seeking lower
health insurance costs, for access to technologi-
cal advances, for cost-reduction methods, and so
forth.26 Part of this competition is designed to
maintain, or even increase, each hospital's share
of the health care market. As individual patient
choice, rather than the decision of an admitting
physician, increasingly affects the selection of a
hospital, advertising and other forms of market-
ing by hospitals have become common prac-
tices.27 At the same time, the very nature of the
health care industry is evolving. 28 In this set-
ting, at least certain types of cooperative ven-
tures with competitors, which might leave each
in a status quo situation without obvious in-
creases in profitability, or perhaps even worse
off than a competitor, understandably might have
a diminished attractiveness.
This emphasis on profitability may offer
another possible explanation for diminished co-
operation. If the principal operating officers of
a hospital are compensated in part based on per-
formance, cooperation with other hospitals,
which will lower costs, but may not necessarily
enhance profits, has less attractiveness.
Yet another explanation for the lack of
greater cooperation may be insurance require-
ments or governmental and regulatory mandates.
Although usually intended to reduce costs, these
sometimes may require the duplication of facili-
ties or programs.
29
The operators of the hospitals, their
boards, trustees or other supervising officials,
may also have conflicting interests. The diffi-
culties in implementing the teen pregnancy pro-
gram described above, because of the philosophi-
cal differences between Memorial Hospital and
the Catholic-affiliated hospitals, offer one stark
illustration of these difficulties. It is unclear
whether other joint projects have also not gotten
off the drawing boards, for a variety of possible
philosophical conflicts.
What lessons may be drawn from this
experience? If cooperative ventures among hos-
pitals, or between hospitals and other members
of the health care industry, are desirable from a
health care policy perspective, and if they are
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also procompetitive, or at worst benign, from an
antitrust perspective, then it is probably not
enough simply to inform hospitals, through the
Policy Statements and otherwise, that these un-
dertakings are permissible. Coaxing, rewarding,
or even mandating this conduct may become
necessary. The safe harbors created by the State-
ments are the first step. I hope that this Confer-
ence will also contribute to the dialogue. But, if
my limited experiences with the microcosm of
St. Joseph County are reflective of similar con-
ditions in other communities, it will probably be
necessary to consider other mechanisms, both
inside and outside the antitrust framework, to
stimulate the number and diversity of such joint
undertakings.
Some of this stimulation will be private.
Since cooperation can lead to reduced costs, both
insurance companies and the employers who fre-
quently pay their employees' premiums have
incentives to urge it. Since cooperation will also
increase the availability of medical services,
underserved members of the community may
well also press for additional steps.
Other stimulation may come from the
government, either at the federal or state level.
State legislation and regulation, including health
planning statutes or certificate of need laws, are
likely to lead to some instances of cooperation
as a way of satisfying requirements imposed on
hospitals.' Proposed reforms to the government
programs providing reimbursement for health
care expenses, which will increase the incentives
on hospitals to control costs even more in the
future, will probably make it more important to
cut those costs through cooperative ventures."
Yet another stimulus to cooperation may be found
in the tax laws. One of the requirements for the
preservation of a hospital's tax-exempt status is
that it must offer a certain level of community
benefits. Frequently, it may turn out that these
can be done most efficiently on a cooperative
basis. Even the repeal of various kinds of re-
strictive legislation, for example, the remaining
certificate-of-need laws, state statutes prohibit-
ing corporations from providing medical ser-
vices, or laws which limit the kinds of services
which certain providers may offer, could open
the door to new forms of horizontal or vertical
cooperation.
Another possible stimulus to cooperation
is a common external "enemy," the specter that
one or more of the hospitals in an area might be
acquired by a for-profit, investor-owned enter-
prise. In a number of communities, an attempted
takeover has led the non-profit entities to unite
to counter that threat. This could then lead, al-
ternatively, to cooperation on other fronts as well,
or to a focus on the takeover, to the exclusion of
all other concerns.
Although fraught with potential danger,
yet another vehicle for facilitating cooperation
are statutes which have recently been enacted in
a number of states, authorizing certain horizon-
tal agreements by hospitals and sometimes other
health care providers, for sharing or allocating
various equipment, facilities or programs, or even
for consummating certain mergers.3 2 These stat-
utes are designed to allow these entities to enjoy
the shield of the state action doctrine,33 which is
available to private parties undertaking conduct
which has been the product of a "clearly articu-
lated and affirmatively expressed state policy,"
which is "actively supervised by" the state. 34
Finally, I do not want to be misunderstood
as forsaking my basic, pro-enforcement, pro-
competition orientation. As stated above, I be-
lieve that calls for yet further relaxation in the
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enforcement of the antitrust laws must be re-
jected. To the contrary, great care must be exer-
cised to insure that the stifling of competition,
which I earlier alluded to as my initial concern
about cooperation, does not become a by-prod-
uct of the already permissive environment.
It then follows that policy-makers must
exercise great caution with respect to any par-
ticularized relaxation of antitrust enforcement for
this industry. Furthermore, since this special
treatment would result in the displacement of the
market forces which otherwise act as constraints
on anti-competitive conduct, other mechanisms
to protect the public might have to be created.
One possibility sometimes suggested is
that various forms of centralized planning and
regulation should be substituted both for anti-
trust enforcement and for market forces such as
competition. However, any regulatory scheme
will inevitably carry with it the costs and delays
incident to any elaborate governmental structure.
In the present political climate, however, the
mood is to dismantle, rather than to erect, regu-
latory systems.35 Because of those consequences
and the public's antipathy to additional govern-
mental intervention, if the competition that the
antitrust laws otherwise attempt to insure were
to be displaced, the implementation of some of
these private alternatives, which would be re-
garded by most people as preferable to regula-
tion, would be necessary.36 Having said that, the
absence of public accountability by many pri-
vate forces is itself a strong argument for con-
tinuation of the present antitrust regime.37
Conclusion
Continued enforcement of the antitrust
laws, with a view towards prohibiting those col-
lusive acts among health care providers which
are designed to stifle competition, remains im-
portant. However, more often than not, coop-
eration can prove pro-competitive, and therefore
beneficial to both consumers of, and payors for,
medical care. The discussion above makes clear
that such cooperation often will not take place
without encouragement or even mandate. Fur-
ther analysis is therefore necessary, both regard-
ing desirable forms of cooperation and of the
steps, short of creating antitrust immunity for the
health care industry, which will make them more
frequent.
E N D N 0 T E S
St. Joseph County had a 1990 population of about 250,000.
THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 397 (1995).
2This area includes Elkhart County to the east (1990 population
of 156,000), Laporte County to the west (107,000), Marshall
County to the south (42,000), all in Indiana, and Berrien
County, Michigan, to the north (160,000). There is at least
one general hospital in each of these counties. Id. at 422,
425.
3 Mishawaka, a city of approximately 40,000, is also in St. Jo-
seph County, immediately to the east of South Bend. Id. at
397.
'Holy Cross Health System Corp. has its headquarters in South
Bend. It operates approximately a dozen hospitals around
the country.
-'Until a few years ago, this hospital was known as the Osteo-
pathic Hospital of South Bend. There are a large number of
osteopathically-trained physicians in the community.
6 This institution, which is also a Catholic hospital, is uncon-
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nected to the other local hospital of similar name. Instead, it
is part of Ancilla Systems, which is headquartered in Hobart,
Indiana and which operates six hospitals in northern Indiana.
7These two hospitals agreed to merge, effective January, 1996.
They now operate as part of a new regional health care orga-
nization, called Ancilla Health Care, which will also include
a separate outpatient facility, a clinic providing primary care
and social services to the underserved, a behavioral health
complex and a center for needy, pregnant women.
Madison Center and Hospital is the largest provider of mental
health services in the region. A not-for-profit corporation, it
offers a full range of psychiatric services, including inpatient,
partial hospitalization, residential and outpatient services to
over 7,000 children, adolescents and adults each year.
9 See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986)
(dentists' refusal to submit x-rays to insurers for use in deter-
mining benefits was unlawful concerted refusal to deal); Ari-
zona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982)
(maximum horizontal price fixing by groups of doctors orga-
nized in medical societies and "foundations for medical care"
was unlawful per se); American Medical Ass'n v. United
States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (restraints on operations of non-
profit group health plan, offering prepaid health care services,
violated ShermanAct's criminal provisions); American Medi-
cal Ass'n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 455
U.S. 676 (1982) (canons of ethics which restricted advertis-
ing and solicitation of patients, and which limited doctors'
ability to engage in non-traditional forms of medical prac-
tice, violated FTC Act § 5).
See also Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322
(1992) (physician's challenge to hospital's decision to release
results of allegedly unfairly conducted peer review proceed-
ing asserted claim in or affecting interstate commerce); Patrick
v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988) (physician's challenge to com-
plaints filed by other physicians, and subsequent revocation
of his hospital staff privileges based on peer review proceed-
ings, was not immunized by state action doctrine). Cf.,
Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2
(1984) (contract between hospital and group of anesthesiolo-
gists, requiring patients in hospital to use services of that group
of doctors, and promising not to hire other radiologists, was
not unlawful either as tying arrangement or as exclusive deal-
ing contract).
See generally John Flynn, Antitrust Policy and Health
Care Reform, 39 ANTITRUST BULL. 59, 70-107 (1993) (dis-
cussing cases).
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
"For example, while Memorial Hospital, but not St. Joseph's
Medical Center, has in-patient psychiatric services, the latter
hospital has the only kidney unit with a lithotriptor in the
county.
2 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission State-
ments of Enforcement Policy and Analytical Principles Re-
lating to Health Care andAntitrust, reprinted in 67 ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), No. 1682 (1994).
'* Among these characteristics are that at least certain medical
procedures, services, drugs and so forth are necessities, which
must be used irrespective of their cost; that access to many
other forms of medical care are viewed by most people in our
society as fundamental rights, often to be supported by gov-
ernmental programs; that perhaps the majority of medical care
is paid for by persons other than the consumer, whether it be
third party insurance or various governmental programs; and
that most consumers are unable to evaluate the necessity for,
and compare the quality of, much medical care.
4 For example, in 1993, Memorial Hospital implemented a "tith-
ing" system, under which it will reserve 10% of the previous
year's surplus for community benefits projects. Qualifying
programs must be collaborative, involving schools, churches,
neighborhood organizations or social service agencies. In-
tended to address an unmet need among underserved popula-
tions, the projects which have already been funded have in-
cluded health screening, educational programs, immuniza-
tion, provision of nursing care and clinics.
"'The Statements are directed primarily at horizontal coopera-
tive arrangements. However, as noted above, market forces
are increasingly making vertical integration both desirable
and necessary. Because of the competitive disadvantages that
less-than-fully-integrated participants will incur if they are
left out of these cooperative ventures, serious attention will
have to be given to the adverse effects on competition from
agreements involving health care providers at different lev-
els of the industry.
6Just one example of the agencies' encouraging tone, designed
to convey their generally permissive attitude toward concerted
activities by hospitals, is the following statement about merg-
ers: "Antitrust challenges to hospital mergers are relatively
rare. Of the hundreds of hospital mergers in the United States
since 1987, the Agencies challenged only a handful, and in
several cases sought relief only as to part of the transaction."
See supra note 12 at I .B. It is almost as if the government is
taking pride in how little is being done to enforce Section 7
of the Clayton Act.
Indeed, this permissive attitude was again manifested
by the October, 1995, agreement by the FTC, to permit the
merger of the nation's two largest hospital chains - Colum-
bia/HCA Healthcare Corp. and Healthtrust Inc. When con-
cluded, the transaction, which is the biggest hospital merger
in history, will result in a corporation with 320 hospitals and
more than 100 outpatient surgery centers in 36 states.
See Fredric J. Entin, Tracey L. Fletcher & Jeffrey M.
Teske, Hospital Collaboration: The Need for an Appropriate
Antitrust Policy, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 107, 119 (1994)
(identifying six mergers, of the only two hospitals in the com-
munity, which went unchallenged by enforcement agencies).
But see, FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11 th
Cir. 1991) (successful challenge to merger of two hospitals
in Augusta, Georgia, which would have resulted in combined
market share of 43%); United States v. Rockford Memorial
Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.) (successful challenge to merger
of two hospitals in Rockford, Illinois, which would have re-
sulted in combined market share of 64-72%, and post-merger
market share of 90% by three largest hospitals), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 920 (1990).
See generally Thomas Campbell & James W. Teevans,
Mixed Signals: Recent Cases Make the Legality of Future
Hospital Mergers Less Predictable, 59 ANrIRUST L.J. 1005
(1991).
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"7See, e.g., Entin, supra note 16, at 110 ("The antitrust laws, as
currently enforced, are inappropriately inhibiting the rational
restructuring of the health care system through collaborative
efforts.") (article by present and former counsel of American
Hospital Association).
"8 For hospitals, competitively structured markets may not pro-
duce an optimal allocation of resources.... To the extent that
competition among hospitals fosters creation of this excess
capacity, the normal competitive paradigm may, in fact, im-
pose costs on purchasers of hospital care." Id. at 123.
However, as discussed below, if it were true that com-
petition is inappropriate to the health care industry, and that
the antitrust laws need to be displaced, some other mecha-
nisms, statutory or regulatory, would need to be inserted to
protect consumer interests. In all likelihood, hospitals would
find these alternatives even less desirable.
19One aspect of the problem is that antitrust's goal of preventing
certain kinds of private interference with market forces is in-
tended in large measure to reduce costs and prices. How-
ever, hospitals and other providers assert that these objec-
tives are often inconsistent with the provision of the highest
quality of medical care, and furthermore that they, in the ex-
ercise of their professional judgment, and acting in the best
interest of their patients, are in the best position to make these
determinations.
201 believe that at most, uncertainty about whether proposed con-
duct violates the antitrust laws may make it somewhat more
time-consuming and expensive to implement certain coop-
erative activity. The enforcement agencies have already taken
important steps to reduce some of these uncertainties by the
issuance of the Policy Statements, frequent speeches to in-
dustry, congressional testimony, and offers of expedited busi-
ness review procedures.
While not denying that there still are costs associated
with complying with the antitrust laws, they are no different
in kind than the costs hospitals face in complying with labor
laws, occupational safety requirements, or any other body of
law designed to protect employees or the general public. And,
there is no more justification for special treatment for hospi-
tals under the antitrust laws, merely to reduce costs, than it
would be to allow hospitals to pay employees less than a mini-
mum wage to accomplish the same goals. Therefore, although
some uncertainty admittedly remains, the costs to society of
removing the health care industry from the ambit of the anti-
trust laws would far outweigh its benefits.
See generally Kevin E. Grady, A Framework forAnti-
trust Analysis of Health Care Joint Ventures, 61 ANTrTRusT
L.J. 765 (1993) (recognizing occasional uncertainty, but sug-
gesting factors making legality of joint venture proposals more
predictable).
21 In fact, given the historical opposition by physicians and other
providers to the introduction of non-traditional means of health
care delivery, it is arguable that were it not for the protection
afforded to competition by the antitrust laws, some of the
innovative and cost-cutting measures that have been recently
adopted, including various insurance products and managed
care plans, might never have gotten off the ground.
2 Although impossible to predict, in the absence of the antitrust
laws, perhaps the most likely scenario in St. Joseph County
would be a further merger by one of the two larger hospitals
with the recently merged Michiana Community-St. Joseph
Mishawaka Hospitals. Although detailed study of the actual
impact on health care users and payors of such a transaction
would of course be necessary, I strongly doubt that the reduc-
tion of South Bend to a two hospital community would be
desirable.
23Congress has already enacted one relatively narrow exemption
for the health care industry. The Health Care Quality Im-
provement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11101-11152 (1988),
provides antitrust immunity for certain peer review proceed-
ings undertaken by hospitals and physicians. See generally
Earl W. Kintner & Joseph P. Bauer, 10 Federal Antitrust Law
§ 75.5 (1994).
2 See generally Thomas L. Greaney, When Politics and Law
Collide: Why Health Care Reform Does Not Need Antitrust
'Reform,' 39 ST. Louis U.L.J. 135 (1994) (rejecting arguments
for changes in antitrust treatment of health care industry).
A different, and alternative, explanation is that the antitrust
laws are sometimes used as an excuse not to cooperate, even
though those laws would not in fact proscribe the activity in
question. Thus, a hypothetical repeal of the antitrust laws
would take away this "cover."
26It is worth noting that while the primary interest of payors is in
cost-reduction, by contrast, consumers of health care often
may prefer more advanced or innovative, but also more costly,
health care. Thus, while it can be expected that government,
insurance companies and employers will look to competition
to result in a greater number of less expensive providers, con-
sumers instead hope competition will yield the "best" pro-
viders and services, with cost being only one of the factors
determining quality.
27This trend is further accelerated by the increasing offering of
out-patient services by hospitals.
28Three of the most prominent of these changes include the need
for providers to be part of a "system," offering a full range of
medical services; new payment methods, as exemplified by
the trend towards "capitation;" and efforts to limit both per-
ceived overutilization of medical services and oversupply of
medical facilities.
29 An example of one such step was the opening by St. Joseph's
Medical Center in 1992 of an obstetrics unit, which had been
closed almost twenty years earlier. One explanation given
for this move was that insurance companies require contract-
ing providers to offer a full line of certain commonly used
and essential services.
3 A similar push towards cooperation at the federal level resulted
from the ill-fated National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act of 1974 (NHPRDA), Pub. L. No. 93-641,
88 Stat. 2225 (1975), which required the establishment of
state and regional health planning and development agencies.
Through control of the issuance of certificates of need, these
agencies were charged, in part, with responsibility for con-
trolling the supply of hospital beds, the acquisition of expen-
sive equipment, and the expansion of facilities and programs.
That statute was criticized, however, in part because it was
felt that market forces were preferable to planning under gov-
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ernment auspices as a means of allocating health resources;
it was repealed, effective in 1987, by the Health Programs
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 701(a), 100 Stat. 3743,
3799 (1987). See also, National Gerimedical Hosp. & Ger-
ontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 452 U.S. 378
( 98 1) (NHPRDA did not create implied antitrust immunity
against claim arising out of local health system agency's re-
fusal to grant approval for construction of hospital facilities).
See generally Maja Campbell-Eaton, Note, Antitrust andCer-
tificates of Need: A Doubtful Prognosis, 69 IowA L. REV. 1451
(1984) (describing and criticizing NHPRDA).
1Certainly a critical step in this direction were the Social Secu-
rity Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65,
which replaced the retrospective approach to reimbursement
of hospitals, based on costs and other defined charges, with a
prospective, fixed price system for payment of many of the
services provided by hospitals. Since a hospital now has to
bear the difference if its own costs exceed that fixed price,
and can keep the difference if its costs fall below that price,
there is an obvious, substantial incentive to control costs in
those areas.
32See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25.5-1-501 et seq. (West 1995);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 22, § 1883 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994);
7 MINN. STAT. ANNOT. § 62J.2911 (Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 131E-192.3 et seq. (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-
17.5 (Supp. 1995); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. TIT. 37, § 3727.21-
.24 (1992); WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 70.44.450 (Supp. 1995);
Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 150.85 (Supp. 1994). See James Blumstein,
Assessing Hospital Cooperation Laws, 8 Loy. CONSUMER L.
REP. 98 (identifying statutes in nineteen states, and question-
ing use of state action doctrine to undermine competitive
forces in health care industry). See generally Sarah S. Vance,
Immunity for State-Sanctioned Provider Collaboration after
icor, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 409, 432-33 (1994) (summarizing
key requirements of thirteen state statutes).
"This doctrine was first articulated in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341 (1943). Its possible applicability to the conduct of pri-
vate parties was first recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976). The
two-part test for its availability was refined in California Re-
tail Liquor DealersAss'n v. MidcalAluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.
97 (1980). See generally, Earl W. Kintner & Joseph P. Bauer,
10 Federal Antitrust Law § 76 (1994).
34 See James F Blumstein, National Health Care Reform on Trial:
Health Care Reform and Competing Visions of Medical Care:
Antitrust and State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 1459, 1486-1505 (1994) (criticizing statu-
tory approach both for introduction of inappropriate, non-com-
petitive considerations and for failure to comply with Parker-
Midcal requirements); David L. Meyer & Charles F Rule,
Health Care Collaboration Does not Require Substantive
Antitrust Reform, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169, 208-11 (1994)
(criticizing use of statutes, which attempt to exempt other-
wise problematic collaborative efforts); Joshua Rosenstein,
Comment, Active Supervision of Health Care Cooperative
Ventures Seeking StateActionAntitrust Immunity, 18 SEATTLE
U.L.REv. 329 (1995) (analyzing Wash. statute).
3"Thus, one of the objections to the state statutes described above,
see supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text, is that their
success depends on "active supervision" by the state, which
may require the detailed regulation which is the object of so
much contemporary public condemnation.
36 The health care reform package proposed by the Clinton ad-
ministration in 1993, its so-called Health Security Act, con-
tained some recognition of this need. The Clinton plan relied
on the creation of a small number of large groups of provid-
ers to lower costs and produce other efficiencies. The very
term used to describe the means of achieving the objectives
of the plan, "managed competition," which may in fact be an
oxymoron, was evidence both of the value of competition
and of the need to recreate it in somewhat different form.
Managed competition sought to address both the anomalies
of competition in the health care industry, and the market
power that these groups of providers would enjoy, by creat-
ing countervailing power on the part of consumers (or more
importantly, insurers), who were to be grouped in health care
alliances. The expectation was that this would encourage
vigorous bargaining between them. See generally Frances
H. Miller, National Health Care Reform on Trial; Health In-
surance Purchasing Alliances: Monopsony Threat or
Procompetitive Rxfor Health Sector Ills?, 79 Cornell L. Rev.
1546 (1994)(concluding that concentrated buying power
growing out of statutorily mandated alliances would have sig-
nificant anti-competitive effect).
"See generally Thomas L. Greaney, Managed Competition, In-
tegrated Delivery Systems andAntitrust, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
1507 (1994) (because of market imperfections in health care
industry, managed competition regime will require combina-
tion of regulation and antitrust enforcement).
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